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Abstract
The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non-trivial forms
of unawareness (Modica and Rustichini, 1994, Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini, 1998).
We introduce a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unaware-
ness among several individuals, and which satisfies strong properties of knowledge
as well as all the desiderata on unawareness proposed this far in the literature.
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1 Introduction
It is hard to argue that decision makers are aware of all facts affecting the outcome of
their decisions. Thus unawareness is a rather natural state of mind and its role merits
investigation, especially in interactive decision making. Yet modeling unawareness proves
to be a tricky task.
Geanakoplos (1989) suggested using non-partitional information structures to this
effect. In such a model one can have states in which an individual doesn’t know an
event and is ignorant of her ignorance. However, Modica and Rustichini (1994) and
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998) show that unawareness operators satisfying certain
fundamental properties allow only for a trivial notion of unawareness in such structures.
Namely, if an agent is unaware of anything, then he is unaware of everything and knows
nothing. More generally, they showed that no standard information structure can capture
adequately the notion of unawareness.1
Modica and Rustichini (1999) suggest an enhanced structure in order to model un-
awareness of an individual. It consists of an “objective” space, describing the world with
the full vocabulary, and a “subjective” space for the sub-vocabulary of which the agent
is aware. When an individual is unaware of an event, the states she considers as possible
belong to a subjective space in which this event cannot be described. Halpern (2001)
offers an alternative formulation with one space but two different knowledge operators –
implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge. Halpern (2001) proves that a particular kind
of his awareness structures is equivalent to the Modica-Rustichini structure as a semantics
for a modal syntax that includes both a knowledge and an awareness modality.
Both these approaches suffer from the following limitations. First, they involve an
explicit use of the modal syntax within the semantic structures. This limits the audience
that is capable of applying this machinery to specific problems. Just as the short paper
by Aumann (1976) introduced to economists the partitional state-spaces as a logic-free
tool to model knowledge, and was thus seminal to a large body of consecutive work in
Economics, the analogue of such a presentation is still lacking for unawareness. Second,
only one-person unawareness is treated explicitly both by Modica and Rustichini (1999)
and Halpern (2001).
In an independent, parallel work, Li (2004) presents a set-theoretic version of a variant
of the Modica and Rustichini (1999) model, and extends it also to the multi-person case.
That extension involves an explicit specification of each player’s state of mind about
others’ state of mind, about their state of mind about others, and so forth.
This complication exemplifies that unlike in the case of knowledge, in which the
passage from the single-person case to the multi-person case involves no substantial
1Ewerhart (2001) suggests a way to model unawareness in a standard information structure. However,
in his modeling if an individual is unaware of an event then she believes its negation. While this property
may be suitable for some aspect or view of unawareness, it is incompatible with all the other formal
approaches cited here, as well as with the approach of the current contribution.
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problems, the modeling of multi-person unawareness is more intricate. An individual i
may be unaware of some issue, and may further be uncertain whether another individual
j is aware of yet another issue (out of those issues of which i is aware). Furthermore, this
uncertainty need not be correlated with the quality of i’s information about the issues of
which she is aware. To model this appropriately, one needs an explicit ordered structure
of spaces, where the possibility set of an individual in a state of one space may reside in
another space, while the possibility set of a different individual in one of these possible
states may reside in yet another space.
To wit, we consider a complete lattice of state-spaces accompanied by suitable projec-
tions among them. The partial order of spaces indicates the strength of their expressive
power. The possibility set of an individual in a state of one space may reside in a less-
expressive space. A crucial feature of the model is that it limits the subsets (of the
union of all spaces) which are considered as events – those that can be “known” or be
the object of awareness. The special structure of events is natural, in the sense that
it is the same as that of subsets of states in which a particular proposition obtains –
if states were to consist of maximally-consistent sets of propositions in an appropriate
logical formulation.2 In particular, in our setting the negation of an event is different
from its set-theoretic complement. As a result, there are states that belong neither to
an event nor to its negation. When the possibility set of an individual consists of such
states, the individual is unaware of the event.
While our model of unawareness is presented in the following section, we apply inter-
active unawareness to an example of speculative trade in section 3. The so called “No-
Trade-Theorems” (e.g., Milgrom and Stokey, 1982) show that when individuals know
what they know and they are never certain of false statements, common knowledge of
rationality precludes speculative trade. This is to be contrasted with e.g. the huge vol-
ume of daily trade in currency exchange, most of which is purely speculative. We show
in a simple example that when combined with unawareness, these strong properties of
knowledge and rationality are compatible with speculative trade. We conclude in section
4. All proofs are presented in the appendix.
2 Model
S = {Sα}α∈A is a complete lattice of disjoint spaces, with , a partial order on S. Denote
by Σ =
⋃
α∈A Sα the union of these spaces.
For every S and S ′ such that S ′  S (“S ′ is more expressive than S – states of S ′
describe situations with a richer vocabulary than states of S”),3 there is a surjective
projection rS
′
S : S
′ → S, where rSS is the identity. (“rS′S (ω) is the restriction of the
2We show this formally in a companion work (in preparation).
3Here and in what follows, phrases within quotation marks hint at intended interpretations, but we
emphasize that these interpretations are not part of the definition of the set-theoretic structure.
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description ω to the more limited vocabulary of S.”) Note that the cardinality of S is
smaller than or equal to the cardinality of S ′. We require the projections to commute:
If S ′′  S ′  S then rS′′S = rS′S ◦ rS′′S′ . If ω ∈ S ′, denote ωS = rS′S (ω). If B ⊆ S ′, denote
BS = {ωS : ω ∈ B}.
Denote by g(S) = {S ′ : S ′  S} the set of spaces that are at least as expressive as S.
For B ⊆ S, denote by B↑ = ⋃S′∈g(S) (rS′S )−1 (B) all the “extensions of descriptions in B
to at least as expressive vocabularies.”
A subset E of Σ is an event if it is of the form B↑ for some B ⊆ S, where S ∈ S. In
such a case we call B the basis of the event E, and S the base-space of E, denoted by
S(E). Hence not every subset of Σ is an event.
If B↑ is an event where B ⊆ S, the negation ¬B↑ of B↑ is defined by (S \B)↑. This
is typically a proper subset of the complement Σ \B↑ .
Intuitively, there may be states in which the description of an event E is both ex-
pressible and valid – these are the states in E; there may be states in which this descrip-
tion is expressible but invalid – these are the states in ¬E; and there may be states in
which neither this description nor its negation are expressible – these are the states in
Σ \ (E ∪ ¬E) = Σ \ S (E)↑. Thus our structure is not a standard state-space model in
the sense of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998), since their “real states” assumption
precludes such events.
If B 6= ∅ and B 6= S for some S ∈ S, then ¬¬B↑ = B↑, but otherwise it is not
necessarily the case. To circumvent this, for each space S ∈ S we devise a distinct
vacuous event ∅S, and define ¬S↑ = ∅S and ¬∅S = S↑. In fact, our notation of an event
E is just the shorthand for (E, S), where S is the base-space. No confusion arises if E
is nonempty, otherwise we write ∅S for (∅, S). The event ∅S should be interpreted as a
“logical contradiction phrased with the expressive power available in S.” It follows from
these definitions that for events E and F , E ⊆ F is equivalent to ¬F ⊆ ¬E only when
E and F have the same base, i.e. S(E) = S(F ).
If
{
B↑λ
}
λ∈L
is a set of events (with Bλ ⊆ Sλ, for λ ∈ L), their conjunction
∧
λ∈LB
↑
λ
is just the intersection
⋂
λ∈LB
↑
λ (we will therefore use the conjunction symbol ∧ and
the intersection symbol ∩ interchangeably). If S = supλ∈L Sλ, then4 this conjunction is(⋂
λ∈L
((
rSSλ
)−1
(Bλ)
))↑
.
The disjunction of
{
B↑λ
}
λ∈L
is defined by the de Morgan law
∨
λ∈LB
↑
λ = ¬
(∧
λ∈L ¬
(
B↑λ
))
.
Typically
∨
λ∈LB
↑
λ $
⋃
λ∈LB
↑
λ, and
∨
λ∈LB
↑
λ =
⋃
λ∈LB
↑
λ holds if and only if all the B
↑
λ
have the same base-space. Intuitively, if two events are described in distinct vocabularies,
the disjunction of the events is expressible only in a vocabulary which is at least as rich
as both vocabularies, but not necessarily in either vocabulary alone.
4Since S is a complete lattice, supλ∈L Sλ exists.
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Example 1. Let Φ be a set of facts. For α ⊆ Φ, let Sα = {ω : ω = {true, false}α}. I.e.,
a state in Sα is a string indicating which facts in α are true and which are false. Sα  Sα′
whenever α ⊆ α′. Consider for instance a set of three facts Φ = {p, q, r}. For example,
we write ω = (p,¬q) for a state in S{p,q} in which the fact p is true and q is false. Clearly,
we have g(S∅) = S, g(S{p,q,r}) = {S{p,q,r}} and e.g. g(S{r}) = {S{r}, S{p,r}, S{q,r}, S{p,q,r}}.
Figure 1 illustrates the state-spaces with the states. The projections are indicated by
arrows (for clarity we do not consider in this figure any compositions of projections and
the identity maps). Consider now the event that fact r is true “[r is true]”. The base-
space is S{r}, the basis of this event is {(r)} ⊂ S{r}. Considering all extensions of {(r)}
we obtain the event
{(r)}↑ = {(r), (p, r), (¬p, r), (q, r), (¬q, r), (p, q, r), (p,¬q, r), (¬p, q, r), (¬p,¬q, r)} = [r is true].
This is the set of states in which fact r obtains. In Figure 1 the event [r is true] is
indicated by the union of the dotted rectangles. The event that r is false [r is false] is
the negation
¬[r is true] = (S{r} \ {(r)})↑ =
{(¬r), (p,¬r), (¬p,¬r), (q,¬r), (¬q,¬r), (p, q,¬r), (p,¬q,¬r), (¬p, q,¬r), (¬p,¬q,¬r)}.
In Figure 1 it is indicated by the union of the grey rectangles. It becomes obvious that
[r is true] ∪ ¬[r is true] $ Σ. I.e., there are states such as (q) which belong neither to
[r is true ] nor ¬[r is true].
I is the set of individuals. For each individual i ∈ I there is a possibility correspon-
dence Πi : Σ→ 2Σ \ ∅ with the following properties:
0. Confinedness: If ω ∈ S then Πi(ω) ⊆ S ′ for some S ′  S.
1. Generalized Reflexivity: ω ∈ Π↑i (ω) for every ω ∈ Σ.5
2. Stationarity: ω′ ∈ Πi (ω) implies Πi (ω′) = Πi (ω).
3. Projections Preserve Awareness: If ω ∈ S ′, ω ∈ Πi(ω) and S  S ′ then ωS ∈
Πi (ωS).
4. Projections Preserve Ignorance: If ω ∈ S ′ and S  S ′ then Π↑i (ω) ⊆ Π↑i (ωS).
5. Projections Preserve Knowledge: If S  S ′  S ′′, ω ∈ S ′′ and Πi(ω) ⊆ S ′ then6
(Πi (ω))S = Πi (ωS).
5Here and in what follows, we abuse notation slightly and write Π↑i (ω) for (Πi(ω))
↑.
6We could have assumed ⊇ and deduce = from ⊇, 3., and the other properties.
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Figure 1: State-Spaces, Projections, and Event Structure in Example 1
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Confinedness means that the states an individual considers as possible in a given
state ω are all “described with the same vocabulary – the vocabulary available to the
individual at ω.”
Generalized Reflexivity and Stationarity are the analogues of the partitional proper-
ties of the possibility correspondence in partitional information structures. In particular,
Generalized Reflexivity will yield the truth property (that what an individual knows in-
deed obtains – property (iii) in Proposition 2); Stationarity will guarantee the introspec-
tion properties (that an individual knows what she knows – property (iv) in Proposition
2, and that an individual knows what she ignores provided she is aware of it – property
5. in Proposition 3).
Properties 3. to 5. guarantee the coherence of the knowledge and the awareness of
individuals down the lattice structure. They compare the possibility sets of an individ-
ual in a state ω and its projection ωS, (“the restriction of the description ω to the more
restricted vocabulary available in S”). The properties guarantee that after this projec-
tion/restriction the individual learns nothing she did not know before, does not forget
anything she knew (provided that it can be expressed with the restricted vocabulary
available in S), and does not become aware of new facts, or unaware of facts of which
she was aware (here again, provided that these facts can be expressed with the restricted
vocabulary available in S).
Remark 1 Property 1 implies that if S ′  S, ω ∈ S and Πi(ω) ⊆ S ′, then rSS′ (ω) ∈
Πi(ω).
Remark 2 Property 4 and Confinedness imply that if S ′  S, ω ∈ S and Πi(ωS′) ⊆ S ′′,
then Πi(ω) ⊆ S∗ for some S∗ with S ′′  S∗.
Remark 3 Property 5 and Confinedness imply Property 3.
Definition 1 The knowledge operator of individual i on events is defined, as usual, by
Ki(E) := {ω ∈ Σ : Πi (ω) ⊆ E} ,
if there is a state ω such that Πi (ω) ⊆ E, and by
Ki(E) := ∅S(E)
otherwise.
Proposition 1 If E is an event, then Ki(E) is an S(E)-based event.
Proposition 2 The Knowledge operator Ki has the following properties:
7
(i) Necessitation: Ki(Σ) = Σ
(ii) Conjunction: Ki
(⋂
λ∈LEλ
)
=
⋂
λ∈LKi (Eλ)
(iii) Truth: Ki(E) ⊆ E
(iv) Positive Introspection: Ki(E) ⊆ KiKi(E)
(v) Monotonicity: E ⊆ F implies Ki(E) ⊆ Ki(F )
(vi) ¬Ki(E) ∩ ¬Ki¬Ki(E) ⊆ ¬Ki¬Ki¬Ki(E)
Proposition 2 says that the knowledge operator has all the strong properties of knowl-
edge in partitional information structures, except for the weakening (vi) of the negative
introspection property. Negative introspection – the property ¬Ki(E) ⊆ Ki¬Ki(E) that
when an individual does not know an event, she knows she does not know it – obtains only
when the individual is also aware of the event (see property 5 of the next proposition).
The “everybody knows” operator on events is defined by
K¯(E) =
⋂
i∈I
Ki(E).
The common knowledge operator on events is defined by
C (E) =
∞⋂
n=1
K¯n(E).
The unawareness operator of individual i from events to events is now defined by7
Ui(E) = ¬Ki(E) ∩ ¬Ki¬Ki(E),
and the awareness operator is then naturally defined by
Ai(E) = ¬Ui(E).
By Proposition 1 and the definition of the negation, we have
Ai(E) = Ki(E) ∪Ki(¬Ki(E)).
Proposition 3 The following properties of knowledge and awareness obtain:
1. KU Introspection: KiUi(E) = ∅S(E)
7This is the Modica-Rustichini (1999) definition. In particular, the Dekel-Lipman-Rustichini (1998)
Plausibility requirement Ui(E) ⊆ ¬Ki(E) ∩ ¬Ki¬Ki(E) is satisfied by this definition.
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2. AU Introspection: Ui(E) = UiUi(E)
3. Weak Necessitation: Ai(E) = Ki
(
S (E)↑
)
4. Strong Plausibility: Ui(E) =
⋂∞
n=1 (¬Ki)n (E)
5. Weak Negative Introspection: ¬Ki(E) ∩ Ai¬Ki(E) = Ki¬Ki(E)
6. Symmetry: Ai(¬E) = Ai(E)
7. A-Conjunction:
⋂
λ∈LAi (Eλ) = Ai
(⋂
λ∈LEλ
)
8. AK-Self Reflection: AiKi(E) = Ai(E)
9. AA-Self Reflection: AiAi(E) = Ai(E)
10. A-Introspection: KiAi(E) = Ai(E)
Properties 1. to 4. have been proposed by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998),
properties 6. to 9. by Modica and Rustichini (1999), and properties 5. to 9. by Halpern
(2001). A-Introspection is the property that an individual is aware of an event if and
only if she knows she is aware of it.
Remark 4 Note that by Proposition 1 and Weak Necessitation, AiAj(E) = Ai(E). In
analogy with the “everybody knows” and the “common knowledge” operators we can define
“everybody is aware” and “common awareness” operators. Note that by Proposition 1
and Weak Necessitation, when everybody is aware of an event E then everybody is also
aware that everybody is aware of E. It then follows that the events “everybody is aware
of E” and “common awareness of E” coincide.
Remark 5 Our unawareness operator is defined on events. However, this does not mean
that we model unawareness of events only. Let an issue or question (e.g. “Is it raining?”)
be such that it can be answered with a fact (“It is raining.”) or with the negation of the
fact (“It is not raining.”). By symmetry, an individual is aware of an event if and only
if she is aware of its negation. Thus, we model the awareness of questions and issues
rather than just single events. Indeed, by weak necessitation, an individual is aware of
an event if and only if she is aware of any event that can be expressed in the space with
the same expressive power.
Example 2. Consider a language with two basic propositions p, q and one individ-
ual with a knowledge modality k. Consider further the structure with four spaces S =
{S{p,q}, S{p}, S{q}, S∅} as indicated in Figure 2 by rectangles. To describe in a compact
fashion the information of the individual in each state, we use the “knowing whether”8
8See Hart, Heifetz and Samet (1996).
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Figure 2: One-person Awareness in Example 2
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modality j defined by jx ≡ kx ∨ k¬x. For a proposition x, the proposition jx means
“the individual knows whether x or ¬x obtain.” The unawareness modality u is defined
by ux ≡ ¬kx ∧ ¬k¬kx.
For simplicity, each state is described by the basic propositions that hold in this state
as well as by the propositions describing the information of the individual at that state.
Thus we present in Figure 2 each state-space in a matrix-style. For example, the state
(jp, jq, p, q) means that p and q obtain, and that the individual knows whether p and
knows whether q. This of course implies that the individual knows p and q as reflected by
the singleton possibility set. For each state ω, the possibility set Π (ω) of the individual
is indicated by circles or ovals, some connected by lines. Other lines relate non-reflexive
states (i.e., states ω such that ω /∈ Π(ω)) to their possibility sets.
For a proposition x we denote by [x] the set of states in which x obtains. Using the
possibility correspondence Π in Figure 2 and the knowledge operator K from definition
1, we can build events such as K[x], ¬K[x], K¬K[x], ¬K¬K[x] and U [x].
Negative introspection fails for non-reflexive states. To see this consider the event
[p], i.e., all states in which p obtains. It is easy to see that (up, jq, p, q) ∈ ¬K[p]. Since
(up, jq, p, q) /∈ K¬K[p], negative introspection fails. Moreover, also K
(
S↑{p,q}
)
= S↑{p,q}
fails since for instance (up, jq, p, q) ∈ S↑{p,q} but (up, jq, p, q) /∈ K
(
S↑{p,q}
)
. However, all
the properties of Propositions 2 and 3 hold.
The example can also serve to highlight the difference between this model and the
Generalized Standard Model (GSM) of Modica and Rustichini (1999) (which Halpern
(2001) proves to be isomorphic to a particular kind of the Awareness Structures of Fagin
and Halpern (1988) ). In the GSM corresponding to this example, only the projections
from the upper-most space S{p,q} to the other spaces S{p}, S{q}, S∅ would be defined, but
not the projections among the lower spaces. More importantly, the states in the last
rows of S{p} and S{q} (the two states in the row up of S{p} and the two states in the row
uq of S{q}) do not exist in the corresponding GSM. Indeed, these states do not belong to
any possibility set of the individual in the states of the space S{p,q} of full descriptions
of states of the world, and are hence redundant when the discussion is restricted to a
single individual. However, it is exactly this kind of extra states that are needed in order
to capture interactive unawareness, e.g. a situation in which one individual believes
that another individual is unaware of something of which she herself is aware. This will
become apparent in the following example, which explicitly features several individuals.
3 Example: Speculative Trade
Consider an owner o of a firm and a potential buyer b. To make this example interesting,
we assume that the agents’ awareness differs. That is, we assume that there is a state
such that the possibility sets of the agents reside in different spaces at that state. For
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instance, the owner is aware that there might be a lawsuit [l] involving the firm but
he is unaware of a potential innovation or novelty [n] enhancing the value of the firm.
In contrast, the buyer is aware that there might be an innovation but unaware of the
lawsuit.
Similarly to Example 2, Figure 3 presents the information structure graphically. The
state spaces S = {S{n,l}, S{n}, S{l}, S∅} are indicated by dotted rectangles. For instance,
in space S{n} the event innovation [n] can be expressed but not the event lawsuit [l]. As
in Example 2, we use for convenience the “knowing whether” operator, jb and jo being
the operator for the buyer and the owner, respectively. Then the ovals with horizontal
lines indicate the possibility sets of the buyer, whereas the ones with vertical lines are
those of the owner. A solid line connects a buyer’s non-reflexive state to its possibility
set, whereas a dotted line corresponds to the owner.
Consider for example the state ω = (¬jbn, uon, ubl,¬jol, n, l). At this state the buyer’s
possibility set resides in S{n}, whereas the owner’s one is in S{l}. Hence the buyer is
unaware of a lawsuit, ω ∈ Ub[l], and the owner of an innovation, ω ∈ Uo[n]. The
possibility sets are such that ω ∈ ¬Kb[n] but ω ∈ Ab[n] and similarly ω ∈ ¬Ko[l] ∩Ao[l].
Let the status quo value of the firm be 100 Taler. I.e., at the state (∅) the value of
the firm is 100 Taler. Suppose further, that if an innovation obtains, it raises the value
of the firm by 10 Taler, whereas the implications of a lawsuit reduce the value by 10
Taler. Since at ω the buyer is aware of the event innovation [n] but unaware of the event
lawsuit [l], the value of the firm to her is either 110 Taler in the event [n] or 100 Taler if
¬[n] obtains. At the same state, the owner values the firm at either 90 Taler in the event
[l] or at 100 Taler if ¬[l] obtains.
We assume that agents are both rational in the sense of maximizing their respective
payoffs, and that both agents know that. I.e., we introduce the mild assumption that if
at all states an agent considers as possible the price is at least x, and in some of these
states the price is strictly higher than x, then the agent strictly prefers to buy at the
price x than not buying at x. Similarly, if at all states the agent considers as possible the
price is at most x, and in some of these states the price is strictly lower than x, then the
agent strictly prefers to sell at the price x than not selling at x. If, on the other hand, the
price is exactly x in all the states that the agent considers as possible, then the agent is
indifferent between trading or not at the price x. We will say that an agent is willing to
trade at x if either she strictly prefers to trade at x or she is indifferent between trading
or not at x.
Suppose now that the buyer offers to buy the firm from the owner for an amount of 100
Taler. Clearly, the buyer is willing to do that because she values the firm at 110 Taler (if
[n] obtains) or 100 Taler (if ¬[n] obtains). Thus, she strictly prefers to buy at 100 Taler.
The buyer also can expect that the owner is going to sell to her, since she believes the
owner is unaware of an innovation that could enhance the value of the firm. In particular,
she believes that the owner’s possibility set at (¬jbn, uon, n) or (¬jbn, uon,¬n) resides in
the space S∅, the owner’s valuation of the firm at state (∅) being 100 Taler. Moreover,
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Figure 3: Information Structure in the Example of Speculative Trade
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the owner accepts the buyer’s offer, since the former values the firm at 90 Taler (if [l]
obtains) or 100 Taler (if ¬[l] obtains). He strictly prefers to sell at 100 Taler. To the
owner, the buyer’s offer is rational, since the owner believes that the buyer’s possibility
set at (ubl,¬jol, l) or (ubl,¬jol,¬l) is in the space S∅, the buyer’s valuation of the firm at
state (∅) being 100 Taler. So in this example, the agents trade, each expecting to make
a strict positive gain and compensating the other with the status quo value.
Formally, in all states of the upper-most space S{n,l} both agents strictly prefer to
trade at the price 100. Moreover, in all states of all spaces both agents are willing to
trade at the price 100, and hence this fact is common knowledge among them. Thus, in
all the states of S{n,l} there is both strict preference for trade and common knowledge of
willingness to trade.
Such a state of affairs is impossible to model in standard information structures in
which the knowledge operators Ki satisfy properties (i)-(v) of proposition 2 (i.e., all the
properties of a partitional information structure except, possibly, for the negative intro-
spection property ¬Ki (E) ⊆ Ki¬Ki (E) ). Indeed, in a standard information structure
Ω with possibility correspondences
(
Πi : Ω→ 2Ω \ ∅
)
i=1,2
for the agents, there would be
common knowledge at a state ω ∈ Ω that both agents are willing to trade at the price
x if and only if there would be a self-evident event E ⊆ Ω (i.e., satisfying Πi (ω′) ⊆ E
for each ω′ ∈ E, i = 1, 2) with Πi (ω) ⊆ E for i = 1, 2, such that both agents are willing
to trade at x in all the states of E. The truth property Ki (E) ⊆ E is equivalent to the
property ω′ ∈ Πi (ω′) (reflexivity). This property would imply that the value in every
ω′ ∈ E is at least x (since the buyer is willing to buy at x in ω′ ∈ E, and ω′ is one of the
states the buyer considers as possible at ω′), and similarly the value in all the states of
E is at most x, since the seller is willing to sell at x. It follows that the value would be
exactly x in all the states ω′ ∈ E. But then, since Πi (ω) ⊆ E, it would not be the case
that at ω each of the agents also strictly prefers to trade at x.
What would happen if we were to “flatten” the model, and consider the union of all
states in all spaces of our unawareness model 3 as one state-space, while retaining the
possibility correspondences? We would then get a standard non-partitional information
model, in which reflexivity (ω ∈ Πi(ω)) and hence the truth property (Ki(E) ⊆ E) fail.
This may be interpreted as delusion on the part of the individuals – at some states they
consider an entirely different set of states as possible.
On one hand, it is known that speculative trade is possible in such a model (Geanako-
plos, 1989). However, it is also clear that the Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998) cri-
tique would apply to the resulting model – it would only allow for a trivial notion of
unawareness.
Our event structure rules out delusions – for every event E and every state ω ∈ E, an
individual does not “know” (believe, respectively) the negation ¬E, since Πi(ω) * ¬E.
The individual’s frame of mind at ω is still consistent with ω in the sense that she
can not believe in facts that do not obtain at ω, but she may perceive less facts than
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actually obtain at ω. Our unawareness structure is thus useful when we want to model
unawareness as the driving force for an economic phenomenon, rather than mistakes in
information processing.
4 Conclusion
Scientists were unaware of gravity until Newton conceived it. Mathematicians are now
unaware of tomorrow’s proof-techniques for today’s long-standing conjectures. Some
investors are unaware of financial market regularities that other investors exploit. In the
large spectrum of such examples, unawareness is conceptually distinct from ignorance,
incomplete information or faulty analysis: It has to do with the lack of conception, not
the lack of knowledge.
To emphasize this distinction, we presented a tractable model of interactive unaware-
ness, in which individuals are nevertheless introspective and non-deluded. Dekel, Lipman
and Rustichini (1998) proved that no standard information space can truly capture the
notion of unawareness. Accordingly, our model features an ordered set of spaces, with
appropriate projections and inter-relations.
We interpret the order relation “” among spaces as ordering the expressive power
or the richness of vocabulary with which states or situations are described. In a com-
panion work we develop this idea formally. Starting with a multi-person epistemic logic
with unawareness and a suitable axiom system, we show that the canonical structure
built of the maximally-consistent sets of propositions in this system (for sub-languages
corresponding to subsets of atomic propositions) is indeed an awareness structure as in
section 2, each of whose states is a model for the propositions of which it consists.
Alternative (though less formal) interpretations of the order relation “” may depend
on the motivation and reasons for unawareness. An individual may be unaware because
of bounded perception or some form of resource boundedness. For instance, perception
is studied (though less formally) in cognitive psychology. This literature suggests that
perception is guided by mental models or categorization. A mental model is an individual
representation of the world (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Mental models may differ in terms
of comprehensiveness, motivating an order relation of expressive power. Categorization
is suggested to guide a human’s perception by filtering observations (Goldstone and
Kersten, 2002). Resource boundedness as source for incomplete knowledge of the relevant
aspects of an individual’s environment was suggested by Simon (1955).
Reasoning takes time and effort, and it is computationally hard to find the best
description. Thus if computational resources run out, individuals may arrive at different
descriptions of the world, and in this sense may be unaware of the descriptions other
people use. Such an argument is developed formally in Aragones, Gilboa, Postlewaite,
and Schmeidler (2003).
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We hope that our model will be helpful for developing applications of unawareness
and bounded perception. Conceivable applications include the implications of unaware-
ness to agreement, Dutch books, consumption behavior, emergence of novelty, insurance,
inconceivable contingencies in (incomplete) contracting etc. This shall be left to future
research.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Ki(E) is an event if there exists a space S ∈ S with a subset B ⊆ S s.t. B↑ = Ki(E).
Assume that Ki(E) is non-empty. Choose ω ∈ Ki(E). We have ω ∈ Ki(E) iff
Πi(ω) ⊆ E. By Generalized Reflexivity, it follows that ω ∈ E. Since E is an event, there
exists a unique base-space S(E). It follows that ωS(E) ∈ E. Note that by Confinedness,
Πi(ω) ⊆ S, for some S  S(E). Thus (Πi(ω))S(E) is defined. Moreover, (Πi(ω))S(E) ⊆
E ∩ S(E). By Projections Preserve Knowledge, we have Π(ωS(E)) ⊆ E.
Define B =
⋃ {Πi(ω) : Πi(ω) ⊆ E ∩ S(E)}. We first show that B = Ki(E) ∩ S(E).
Note, that by the definition of B and by Stationarity, we have B ⊆ Ki(E)∩S(E). We also
have B ⊇ Ki(E)∩ S(E). Indeed, if ω ∈ Ki(E)∩ S(E), then by Confinedness Πi (ω) ⊆ S
for some S  S(E), and by Generalized Reflexivity S(E)  S, implying together that
Πi (ω) ⊆ S(E). Therefore, by Generalized Reflexivity, ω ∈ Πi(ω). Since ω ∈ Ki(E), that
is Πi(ω) ⊆ E, and since Πi (ω) ⊆ S(E), we have ω ∈ Πi(ω) ⊆ E ∩ S (E), that is ω ∈ B.
We now have to show that B↑ = Ki (E). Let ω ∈ B↑, that is ω ∈ S for some
S  S(E) and ωS(E) ∈ B. By the definition of B, ωS(E) ∈ Πi (ω′) for some ω′ such
that Πi (ω
′) ⊆ E ∩ S(E). By Stationarity we therefore have Πi(ωS(E)) = Πi (ω′) ⊆ B.
By Remark 2, it follows that Πi(ω) ⊆ S ′, for some S ′  S(E). Therefore (Πi(ω))S(E) is
defined, and by Projections Preserve Knowledge, we have (Πi(ω))S(E) = Πi(ωS(E)) ⊆ E.
Since E is an event, it follows that (Πi(ω)) ⊆ E and hence ω ∈ Ki(E).
In the reverse direction, let ω ∈ Ki(E), that is Πi(ω) ⊆ E. By Confinedness, we have
Πi(ω) ⊆ S, for some S  S(E), and by Generalized Reflexivity ω ∈ S ′ for some S ′  S.
Hence (Πi(ω))S(E) is defined. Since E is a S(E)-based event, we have (Πi(ω))S(E) ⊆ E ∩
S(E). By Projections Preserve Knowledge, we have Πi(ωS(E)) = (Πi(ω))S(E) ⊆ E∩S(E),
and therefore Πi(ωS(E)) ⊆ B. By Generalized Reflexivity and the fact that ωS(E) ∈ S(E),
we have ωS(E) ∈ Πi(ωS(E)) ⊆ B and hence ω ∈ B↑.
Finally, if Ki(E) is empty, then by the definition of the Ki-operator, we have Ki(E) =
∅S(E). 
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Ki(Σ) = Σ follows directly from the definition of Ki.
(ii) We have ω ∈ Ki
(⋂
λ∈LEλ
)
iff Πi(ω) ⊆
⋂
λ∈LEλ iff Πi(ω) ⊆ Eλ, for all λ ∈ L iff
ω ∈ Ki(Eλ), for all λ ∈ L iff ω ∈
⋂
λ∈LKi(Eλ).
(iii) Let ω ∈ Ki(E), that is Πi(ω) ⊆ E. Since E is an event, Π↑i (ω) ⊆ E. By
Generalized Reflexivity, ω ∈ Π↑i (ω). Hence ω ∈ E. In the case of Ki(E) = ∅S(E), we
trivially have Ki(E) ⊆ E.
(iv) Let Πi(ω) ⊆ E and ω′ ∈ Πi(ω). We have to show that ω′ ∈ Ki(E), that is
Πi(ω
′) ⊆ E. But by Stationarity we have Πi(ω′) = Πi(ω) ⊆ E. So we have shown that
Ki(E) ⊆ KiKi(E) in case Ki(E) is not empty. If Ki(E) = ∅S(E), then Ki(E) ⊆ KiKi(E)
since by Proposition 1 KiKi(E) is S (E)-based.
(v) Monotonicity follows directly from the definition of Ki.
(vi) By the definition of the Unawareness operator and Strong Plausibility in Propo-
sition 3, we have ¬Ki(E)∩¬Ki¬Ki(E) = Ui(E) =
⋂∞
n=1 (¬Ki)n (E) ⊆ ¬Ki¬Ki¬Ki(E).
(Note that property (vi) of Proposition 2 will neither be used in the proof of Lemma 1,
nor in the proof of Proposition 3.) 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Lemma 1 Let E and F be events with the same base-space S. Then
Ki(F ∨Ki(E)) = Ki(F ∪Ki(E)) = Ki(F ) ∪Ki(E).
Proof of the Lemma: By Proposition 2, we have Ki(Ki(E)) = Ki(E). Since, by
Proposition 1 all the events in the lemma are S-based, ∨ is equal to ∪, the set-theoretic
union.
By the monotonicity of theKi-operator, we haveKi(F∪Ki(E)) ⊇ Ki(F )∪Ki(Ki(E)) =
Ki(F ) ∪Ki(E).
Conversely, let ω ∈ Ki(F ∪Ki(E)).
1. case: Let ω′ ∈ Πi(ω) ∩Ki(E). Since ω′ ∈ Ki(E) it follows that Πi(ω′) ⊆ E. But by
Stationarity, we have Πi(ω) = Πi(ω
′) and hence ω ∈ Ki(E).
2. case: Πi(ω) andKi(E) are disjoint. Since ω ∈ Ki(F∪Ki(E)), we must have Πi(ω) ⊆ F
and hence ω ∈ Ki(F ).
Thus we have shown that Ki(F ∪Ki(E)) ⊆ Ki(F ) ∪Ki(E). 
Proof of Proposition 3: For convenience, the proof of the properties follows a different
order than in the statement of the Proposition.
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(1.) KiUi(E) = Ki(¬Ki(E)∩¬Ki¬Ki(E)) = Ki¬Ki(E)∩Ki¬Ki¬Ki(E) ⊆ Ki¬Ki(E)∩
¬Ki¬Ki(E) = ∅S(E).
(3.) Ai(E) = Ki(E) ∪ Ki¬Ki(E) = Ki(Ki(E)) ∪ Ki(¬Ki(E)) = Ki(S(E)↑), where
the last equality follows from Lemma 1 above.
(2.) Ui(E) = UiUi(E) is equivalent to AiUi(E) = Ai(E). AiUi(E) = KiUi(E) ∪
Ki¬KiUi(E). By KU-Introspection and Weak Necessitation, the last term is equal to
∅S(E) ∪Ki(¬∅S(E)) = Ki(S(E)↑) = Ai(E). Thus Ui(E) = UiUi(E).
(6.) Since S(E) = S(¬E), we have by Weak Necessitation that Ai(¬E) = Ai(E).
(5.) By Symmetry and the properties of the knowledge operator, ¬Ki(E)∩Ai¬Ki(E) =
¬Ki(E) ∩ AiKi(E) = ¬Ki(E) ∩ (KiKi(E) ∪ Ki¬KiKi(E)) = (¬Ki(E) ∩ KiKi(E)) ∪
(¬Ki(E)∩Ki¬KiKi(E)) ⊆ (¬Ki(E)∩Ki(E))∪(¬Ki(E)∩Ki¬Ki(E)) = ∅S(E)∪(¬Ki(E)∩
Ki¬Ki(E)) ⊆ Ki¬Ki(E). The reverse direction follows by Truth and the definition of
awareness.
(4.) By the definition of Ui we have
⋂∞
n=1(¬Ki)n(E) ⊆ ¬Ki(E)∩¬Ki¬Ki(E) = Ui(E).
It therefore remains to prove the reverse inclusion Ui(E) ⊆
⋂∞
n=1(¬Ki)n(E), which, since
the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of the inclusion are both S (E)-based events,
is equivalent to
∨∞
n=1Ki((¬Ki)n−1(E)) =
⋃∞
n=1Ki((¬Ki)n−1(E)) ⊆ Ai(E) (Since, again,
all the involved events are S(E)-based, the disjunction and union operators coincide.)
The proof proceeds by induction. If n = 1, then Ki((¬Ki)1−1(E)) = Ki(E) ⊆ Ai(E).
If n = 2, then Ki((¬Ki)2−1(E)) = Ki¬Ki(E) ⊆ Ai(E).
For the induction step, we show that ifKi((¬Ki)n−1(E)) ⊆ Ai(E), thenKi((¬Ki)n+1(E)) ⊆
Ai(E). Set F = (¬Ki)n−1(E). By Weak Negative Introspection, and the fact that all
the events occurring here are S(E)-based, we have (¬Ki)2(F ) ⊆ Ki(F ) ∪ Ui¬Ki(F ).
By Monotonicity of the Ki-operator, and Lemma 1, it follows that Ki[(¬Ki)2(F )] ⊆
Ki[Ki(F ) ∪ Ui¬Ki(F )] = Ki(F ) ∪ KiUi(¬Ki(E)). Applying KU-Introspection, we ob-
tain Ki(F ) ∪ KiUi(¬Ki(E)) = Ki(F ) ∪ ∅S(E) = Ki(F ). By the induction hypothesis,
Ki(F ) ⊆ Ai(E).
(7.) By Weak Necessitation, Proposition 2, and the fact that
⋂
λ∈L
(
S(Eλ)
↑) =
S
(⋂
λ∈L(Eλ)
)↑
, we have
⋂
λ∈LAi (Eλ) =
⋂
λ∈LKi
(
S(Eλ)
↑) = Ki (⋂λ∈L S(Eλ)↑) =
Ki
(
S(
⋂
λ∈LEλ)
↑) = Ai (⋂λ∈LEλ).
(8.) AiKi(E) = KiKi(E) ∪Ki¬KiKi(E). By Positive Introspection last term equals
KiKi(E)∪Ki¬Ki(E). Applying again Positive Introspection yields Ki(E)∪Ki¬Ki(E) =
Ai(E).
(9.) By Weak Necessitation, Ai(E) = Ki(S(E)
↑) = Ai(F ), for any event F with
S(F ) = S(E). Set F = Ai(E). Hence Ai(E) = AiAi(E).
(10.) By Weak Necessitation, we have Ai(E) = Ki(S(E)
↑). By (iii) and (iv) in
Proposition 2, we haveKi(S(E)
↑) = KiKi(S(E)↑), and hence Ai (E) = KiAi (E) obtains.

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